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1. INTRODUCTION
Uncertainty and risk are inherent
conditions of decision making in business
management. According to Knight (1921),
the business risk is excluded from insurance
markets for two main reasons. First, the
uncertainty associated with many
entrepreneurial decisions is idiosyncratic and
not measurable, which precludes an efficient
assessment of such a risk for outsiders.
Second, the relationship between an
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against an eventual loss is exposed to a moral
hazard problem. In this context, the
entrepreneur should be characterized by her
lower degree of risk aversion and her
superior skills for making decisions in highly
uncertain environments.
Therefore, the way in which decision-
makers face and manage risks are key
aspects when looking into particularly
relevant issues for business administration
and, specifically, for strategic management.
Furthermore, risk analysis has been one of
the central aspects in the development of
models and theories aimed at valuing
tradeable assets and serving as a guide for
the investor’s actions in her rent-seeking
behavior. A clear example of such attempts is
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Sharpe,
1964; Lintner, 1965; Black, 1972), based on
Markowitz’ (1952) theory of portfolio
selection. But risk management has also
garnered increasing importance in the
research field of strategic management when
exploring several phenomena of interest in
this area, such as corporate diversification
decisions (Chiu, 2007), innovation (Genus &
Coles, 2006) internationalization (Figueira
de Lemos et al., 2011), restructuring
(Muñoz-Bullón & Sanchez-Bueno, 2011),
real options (McGrath, 1999) or equity
control in family business (Gómez Mejía et
al., 2007).
However some empirical evidence
appears to defy the predictions of the
classical perspective on asset pricing models.
The seminal work of Bowman (1980) and
later evidence (Fiegenbaum & Thomas,
1988) called into question the widely
accepted principle within the financial
orthodoxy that the average value and the
variability of the return of a given investment
should be positively related.
Research in strategic management offers
interesting but still scarce evidence about the
link between risk and strategy. Our work
attempts to explore this issue by proposing
and testing a set of hypotheses that explore
the link between the behavior of the
entrepreneur as a manager of her business
and her decisions as an investor in the capital
market through the instrument of the
Investment Company with Variable Capital
(SICAV). Our basic objective is to analyze,
explain and test the relationship between
business growth decisions taken by the
entrepreneur and some basic features of her
strategy and performance as an investor in
the capital market. Given the lack of
available evidence on this topic, the present
paper should attract substantial interest as a
first exploratory attempt to examine the
relationship between managerial and
investing actions when they are taken by the
same decision maker.  In particular, we are
interested in explaining and exploring the
potential link between the risk and
profitability associated with running a real
business and the outcomes derived from
investing in the stock market. The answer to
this question not only provides interesting
evidence able to fill the existing gap in the
literature but can also raise new avenues for
the development of possible theoretical
advances about why and how entrepreneurs
face and manage uncertainty.
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Previous research on risky decision-
making suggests that there are three clusters
of influential factors: characteristics of the
individual decision maker, characteristics of
the organizational context, and
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(Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). Risk propensity or
the preference for risk can clearly affect the
behavior of different decision makers facing
the same choice problem. Brockhaus (1980)
stated that the overall attitude of the
individual toward risk would predispose
some individuals (e.g. entrepreneurs) to
undertake more risks than others (e.g.
bureaucrats). In addition, some empirical
findings are consistent with the idea that
more mature decision makers are more risk
averse than their less mature counterparts
(MacCrimon & Wehrung, 1990). In addition,
context-related factors such as the
composition of the group (Janis, 1968), the
organizational culture (Deal & Kennedy,
1982), the leadership traits (Nutt, 1986), and
the organization control systems (March &
Shapira, 1987) are also acknowledged to be
relevant in the context of risky decisions.
Finally, the level of past experience or the
level of familiarity with the problem itself
may account for significant differences in the
response to risky choices (March & Shapira,
1987). Perhaps the most well-known
problem-related factor capable of
influencing risk behavior is problem
framing. This factor is defined as whether the
situation is presented to the decision maker
as an opportunity or a threat or in terms of
gains or losses. The influential work of
Kaheman and Tversky (1979) and
subsequent empirical evidence (Neale et al.,
1986; Singh, 1986) provide support for the
idea that individuals tend to be more risk
averse when the same problem is presented
in terms of potential gains rather than in
terms of potential losses.
When studying the behavior of a given
decision maker in both a real business and in
financial markets, we are implicitly
assuming that the individual characteristics
remain stable while the context-related
and/or problem-related factor can differ
between those decisions taken by the
entrepreneur when managing her business
and those others in which she is acting as an
investor in financial markets. In the real
sector we will take as the basis of our study
the strategy of business growth and its
profitability. Business growth is a central
aspect of interest in the business
administration literature, both for its
importance and for the complexity and
uncertainty of its results (Rosenberg, 2004).
As a basis for the hypotheses proposed in
this paper, we find support from different
conceptual approaches able to deliver
predictions about the link between real and
financial decisions of a given decision
maker. Within the research field of
management we find valuable support from
the so-called Resource-based view
(Wernerfelt, 1984) and the theory of decision
making (Kaheman & Tversky, 1979) as
foundations of our theoretical development
and hypotheses.
2.1 The relationship between the
management of a real business and
investment in capital markets
From the perspective of neoclassical
economic theory, the main objective of the
business owner is to maximize the returns
from her investments (Sundaram & Inkpen,
2004) whether they result from real or
financial assets. Therefore rational
individuals acting as investors would seek to
maximize their overall profits resulting from
any kind of (real and financial) assets they
own.
The resource-based view (Barney, 1991;
Peteraf, 1993; Wernerfelt, 1984) emphasizes
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capabilities as dominant factors in acquiring
and sustaining a competitive advantage and
superior rents. Management skills in terms of
an enhanced analytical capability, the ability
to identify business opportunities and an
efficient process for managing information
and risks play a leading role in achieving a
privileged competitive position (Aaker,
1989) and in realizing growth opportunities
(Kor, 2003). Firms with “inferior” resources
but efficiently managed can exhibit better
outcomes than other companies with
“superior” resources but poorer managerial
capabilities (Mahoney, 1995). Such
capabilities depend upon both the individual
characteristics of the manager and her
experience accumulating from past decisions
and, hence, they are non-tradeable, scarce
and hard to imitate and substitute, key
features of a capability to become a basis of
a sustainable competitive advantage (Barney,
1991).
Information is another crucial strategic
resource particularly relevant to understand
the potential synergy of real business and
investment decisions. Access to more and
better information helps to increase the
knowledge base of the firm that can be
applied in different arenas. Information can
be considered strategic when it places the
entrepreneur in a privileged position as it
facilitates the detection and assessment of
opportunities not obvious for less informed
decision makers. Also, the availability of this
information has an obvious value for an
investor to the extent that she can reduce
uncertainty and generate more accurate
expectations about the value of a marketable
asset1.
Information and business networks (the
set of business relationships, both internal
and external) are one of the most important
intangible assets in explaining business
success (Hall, 1992). Information is
transmitted to agents outside firms, due to
various social links based on their
educational or professional contacts (Cohen
et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 2010). Executives
are integrated into a social network that
includes contacts from their academic and
professional careers. This social network is
likely to favor the acquisition of valuable
information by means of information sharing
and exchanging that improves their business
outcomes (Fracassi & Tate, 2012), especially
regarding corporate financial decisions
(Fracassi, 2008), given the restricted access
information for agents outside the social
network.
This kind of information meets several
features of interest that qualify it as a
“strategic resource” (Barney, 1991). First, it
is a versatile resource, i.e, it can support
alternative uses without loss of value. For
example, activities related to managing a
business in the real sector provide access to
data such as customer needs, demand
forecasting, and technology, which cannot be
easily known by outsiders to the business in
that sector. This information can be useful to
reduce uncertainty and to create more
accurate expectations about investment
opportunities or about the value of financial
assets traded in public markets. From this
perspective, the greater profitability of an
“entrepreneur-investor” may be indicative of
the existence of private information useful to
achieve a greater return of her financial
portfolio of marketable assets.
To sum up, as discussed above the
entrepreneur’s social network and private
information would justify a better outcome
of both real and financial activities, which
lead us to formulate the following
hypothesis:
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1In fact, the existence and control of such information in the latter case is of particular interest for the authorities concerned with the insider
trading problem in capital markets, since managers can make an illegitimate use of their proprietary information by taking advantage over
outsider investors.Hypothesis 1a: the performance of the
real business management of the
entrepreneur-investor is positively related to
the outcomes of her financial decisions.
However, some researchers claim that the
kind of activities in which a given
managerial resource can be successfully
applied may vary depending on its nature
and, therefore, firm- or industry-specific. In
this line, Castanias and Helfat (1991) defined
three types of managerial skills: generic,
type of business or industry-related, and
firm-specific skills. Superior managerial
outcomes can be at least partially attributable
to the bundle of abilities and expertise that
the manager owns and deploys successfully
in all of her businesses. A manager’s abilities
regarding the decision-making process,
leadership skills and the expertise to identify
profitable investment opportunities can be
highly firm-specific since its value when
applied to other businesses might decay
substantially. The eventually limited scope of
these managerial resources would entail a
trade-off between the time and effort devoted
to running the main business and those
required to optimize the manager’s portfolio
decisions.
In other words, assuming that the
information or management skills are
industry or business specific, it follows that a
manager with private information or superior
skills would not necessarily obtain better
results from her role as an investor. Under
this logic, the available resources and
abilities are limited and no potential
synergies between real and financial
management can be realized because of the
specific nature of such resources and skills.
Given the limited amount of time and efforts
available to a manager, we should expect that
the higher manager’s commitment to running
her real business would result in a poorer
outcome in her role as an investor in
financial markets. Regarding this point, we
are aware that the investor actions of an
entrepreneur in financial markets are mostly
carried out by specialized agents2 whose
goals are presumably not fully aligned with
the investor’s interests. If managerial
resources and skills are highly specific to her
real business, they should deliver little or no
value when applied to her investment
activities, and the “entrepreneur-investor”
must also deflect time and effort from her
main business to monitor the agent’s
behavior.
Thus, assuming that the resources and
capabilities of managers are highly specific
to their main real business, and given the
agency costs associated with the delegation
of the investment decisions of the
“entrepreneur-investor” in capital markets,
we should expect support for the following
alternative hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b: the performance of the
real business management of the
entrepreneur-investor is negatively related to
the outcomes of her financial decisions.
2.2 Relationship between risk of real
business and financial portfolio return
From a purely financial perspective, the
criteria proposed for assessing and
evaluating investment projects are solely
based on their expected returns and
perceived risk (Markowitz, 1952) and,
therefore, the fact that the assets traded and
exploited are real or financial is irrelevant.
From this perspective, “entrepreneur-
investors” will evaluate investment
opportunities in the light of their impact on
their total wealth, notwithstanding their
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and/or financial assets. Assuming that
investors are risk averse, criteria for
investment choice would favour those
options with higher expected returns and
lower risk (Brealey & Myers, 1981). Given a
limited amount of wealth to invest, rational
decision makers confronted with a set of
investment options of similar expected return
should start by selecting those projects with
lower risk. As the amount of initial wealth
increases, investors are likely to bear an
increasing level of risk in subsequent
projects. Under this assumption, a higher
return on financial assets enhances the
entrepreneur’s access to external funding,
and she should then be ready to invest in
riskier (financial and real investment)
projects.
In the case of external financing, reducing
information asymmetry between
entrepreneur and providers of funds is
essential to ensure an efficient functioning of
the market as an exchange device (Spence,
2002). When the existence of private
information is presumed, the entrepreneur
must provide credible information in order to
attract resources (Michael, 2009). Following
the logic of signaling theory, the
entrepreneur (insider) must choose whether
and how to signal that private information,
and the provider of funds (outsider) must
choose how to construe the signal (Connelly
et al., 2011). In this vein, a CEO can use as a
signal the observable quality of the financial
balance sheets of the company to help fund
suppliers to identify the unobservable
“quality” of the management (Zhang &
Wiersema, 2009). We can also venture that a
bank as a lender in a competitive but not
transparent market can reasonably construe
that a high profitability of a financial
portfolio is a credible signal able to
distinguish those entrepreneurs with superior
resources in terms of private information,
valuable social contacts or any other
managerial resources or skills. As a result,
the success of an entrepreneur in her role as
an investor in financial markets nurtures the
confidence of funds suppliers in her
discretional choices when selecting real
investment projects related to her main
business. From this perspective, the provider
of external funding may be willing to offer
better conditions (in terms of an extended
funding limit or a lower cost) to finance
business projects for entrepreneurs who have
a proven history of success in the financial
market.
Taken together, the implications of the
above discussion lead us to propose the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a: the risk level of an
entrepreneur’s main business is positively
related to the return of her portfolio of
financial marketable assets.
Conversely, the so-called prospect theory
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) supports an
opposite prediction. From this view, the
attitude towards risk is not an inherent trait
of individuals but a context-dependant
feature and therefore a given individual’s
response to a choice under uncertainty can
vary depending upon how the decision
maker perceives and evaluates the
uncertainty involved in the decision
problem. In particular, previous research
supports that when the expected returns of a
given action are above a given subjective
target level, individuals behave as risk
averse, but as lower returns are expected
regarding such a target, individuals are liable
to riskier behavior (Núñez Nickel & Cano
Rodríguez, 2002). This prediction is
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research related to business decision making
(Bowman, 1982; Fiegenbaum & Thomas,
2004). Some influential research on using
financial assets as an empirical setting
suggests that the link between risk and
expected return is not statistically significant
and even negative (Fama & French, 1992).
This finding appears to be even more robust
in the case of investment in real assets in
accordance to the so-called Bowman
paradox (Bowman, 1982; Núñez Nickel &
Cano Rodríguez, 2002).
Research on management provides an
additional avenue to explore the eventual
link between risk and return of an
entrepreneur-investor’s decisions. Owing to
the increasing competition in global markets,
companies are trying to reinvent their
business and sustain competitive advantage
through collaboration (Bititci et al., 2004).
From the traditional strategic view where
business units were the main subjects of
competitive actions (Porter, 1980; Porter,
1985), the new scenario suggests that
companies also formulate their strategy in
terms of competition between value chains
(Horvath, 2001). As a result, firms are urged
to adopt new organizational structures and to
redefine the conventional role attributed to
the sellers and the buyer as subjects of
transactions in the market. In this new arena,
the search for efficiency and effectiveness
prompts companies to reformulate the basis
of their links to the upstream and
downstream levels of their value chain by
integrating trading partners (Barratt &
Oliveira, 2001), sharing information and
profits (McLaren et al., 2002).
This rationale can also apply to the
relationship between the entrepreneur-
investor and banks as source of financial
services. At this point we must be aware that
the level of commitment between an
entrepreneur-investor and her bank is
reinforced by the fact that the activities
involved in such a relationship consist of a
broad set of services that exceeds the
financing function. Banks are also acting as
valuable advisors and consultants in their
contracts with the “entrepreneur-investor,”
who benefits from the specialized knowledge
and expertise of banks in both real business-
related and investment-related activities.
From this view, the level of commitment
between the provider of financial resources
and services (i.e. the bank) and its client
becomes reinforced when such a client acts
not only as a borrower but also as a “buyer”
of additional financial services such as
consulting and mediating activities, which
are valuable when investing in capital
markets. The multiple and joint contracting
of such activities entails obvious shared
profits for both parties assuming that the
same financial institution that acts as a funds
supplier is also providing support for
managing the financial investments of the
“entrepreneur-investor”. A major implication
of this fact is that the relationship between a
bank and an “entrepreneur-investor” should
not necessarily be viewed as a sum of
independent contracts (i.e., funding,
management and advice of financial assets)
but rather it might reflect the outcome of a
bargaining process in which all contractual
terms are taken into consideration. For
example, a bank, which agrees to finance a
real investment project with a high level of
risk, can claim compensation by charging
higher fees or by ensuring that the
entrepreneur adds certain financial assets to
her portfolio. As a consequence, the
increased uncertainty borne by the bank
owing to an entrepreneur’s risky actions can
be insured by a more highly liquid (and
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portfolio, which serves as a collateral
warranty in case of financial default.
The above rationale leads us to propose
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2b: the risk level of an
entrepreneur’s main business is negatively
related to the return of her portfolio of
financial marketable assets.
3. METHODOLOGY: SAMPLE AND
VARIABLES
Given that our interest is to examine and
test the potential relationships between the
two roles of the same individual, we have
chosen these individuals or “entrepreneurs-
investors” as the units of our analysis. We
define “entrepreneur-investor” as the natural
person who significantly owns and performs
a real business and, simultaneously, acts as
an active investor in public financial
markets.
This definition entails some
complications for empirical purposes since
conventional data bases are usually defined
on business units or portfolios rather than on
information about their owners or managers.
To overcome these problems, we have
focused on individuals who met the
following two criteria: (1) he/she owned a
majority share of a “Sociedad de Inversión
de Capital Variable” (hereafter SICAV)
namely an “Investment Company of Variable
Capital” in English terms; and (2) he/she was
the chief executive or senior manager and
majority owner of a company with activity in
the real market.
The SICAV is an investment company
with substantial tax benefits since the
realized gains are taxed at the reduced rate of
1% while the general tax rate for limited
liability Spanish companies ranged from
10% to 35% (Ramos Núñez & Ruiz
Almendral, 2006; Tusquets Trias de Bes,
2001). There are also a number of
requirements that SICAVs must meet. First, a
minimum of 100 sharers of the SICAV is
needed even though minimum majorities are
not required. Second, the minimum amount
of equity must be € 2,400,000. Third, the
SICAV cannot hold more than 5% of the total
equity of any company of its portfolio and at
least 90% of their total investments must
correspond to securities listed on official and
public markets. Fourth, as a requirement of
liquidity, the SICAV must hold at least 3% of
its total equity in current accounts.
Clearly, an entrepreneur can opt for
investment tools other than the SICAV to
operate as an investor in public markets,
however given their tax advantages this
instrument has become a privileged and very
popular way for wealthy investors to operate
in official capital markets3. In addition, data
available from the “Comisión Nacional del
Mercado de Valores” or CNMV (analogous
to the SEC in the US), provides a desirable
level of homogeneity and verification of data
on Spanish SICAVs. In addition, SICAVs or
analogous investment companies owned by
the entrepreneur can also be registered in
other countries of the EU such as France,
Italy, Luxembourg and Switzerland. The
limited access to data of SICAV registered in
other countries and the eventual problem of
heterogeneity of such data led us to consider
in our sample only the SICAV registered in
Spain.
To build our database we accessed the
records of the 3,083 SICAVs registered in
Spain according to the CNMV records. We
identified the chairman of the board of the
listed SICAVs and searched for
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Spain.correspondences among the CEOs of the
5,000 largest Spanish companies by sales in
2010 published by the specialized journal
“Actualidad Económica”, and produced by
Iberinform International® on a yearly basis.
Finally, our sample for empirical purposes
consisted of the set of individuals that met
these two criteria: (1) she/he appears as the
Chairman of the Board of at least one SICAV
and (2) she/he was also registered as CEO or
Chairman of the Board in one or more or the
5,000 largest Spanish firms in 2010.
After identifying our list of
“entrepreneurs-investors”, we collected data
from their main real business from the
specialized journal “Actualidad Económica”,
and the Worldscope® database, compiled by
Thomson Reuters®. Data on SICAVs were
gathered from the CNMV files.  Our data
correspond to a five-year period (2006 to
2010), and the final number of
“entrepreneur-investors” was 69 with a total
sample size (individual-year) of 265
observations.
Some of our hypotheses are based on the
assumption that the financial institution that
supported the foundation and management of
the SICAV is the same one that acts as a
financial provider of funds and further
assistance in terms of consulting and advice.
Although this assumption cannot be
confirmed by the available data we venture
that it is very likely given the advantages for
both parties of multiple contracting in terms
of information economies and the
simplification of administrative and
bureaucratic processes. In addition, not only
SICAVs but also a great majority of the
professionals in capital markets investment
are employees, delegates or agents of some
of the largest banks in Spain. A similar
argument can serve to justify that there are
no obvious advantages in holding the
majority ownership of two or more SICAVs,
given the minimum level of equity required
and the eventual diversification of resources
entailed in managing several investment
companies. However we did find several
cases of entrepreneurs who owned a major
share of two or more SICAVs. A potential
explanation for this fact is that such
entrepreneurs might find advantages in
collaborating with several financial
institutions as a result of their focus and
specialization in certain financial services
such as consulting in internationalization,
innovation or partner searching activities.
3.1 Variables of interest
Since our goal is to analyze the
relationship between risk and performance
variables of both real and purely financial
decisions taken by an entrepreneur-investor,
we should propose representative measures
of these constructs (risk and expected return)
for this individual’s role as manager and
owner of a real business and her behavior as
an investor in financial markets. Such
indicators and variables are described below.
Real assets risk (Growth): We
approximate the level of risk of the real
business by means of the yearly growth rate
of total firm assets. A growth strategy fulfills
a broad set of conditions to be considered a
risky decision (Sturdivant et al., 1985;
Hamilton & Shergill, 1992). Against the
more secure option of supplying the current
customers with the existing resources,
enlarging the firm size entails an increased
commitment in terms of additional
resources, shifting organizational structures
and satisfying new needs and/or customers.
All these activities are characterized by a
variable level of uncertainty with scarcely
predictable outcomes. Clearly, managerial
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are core decisions because they often imply
important changes in the firm’s
organizational objectives and future
performance, and can even alter its chances
for survival.
Firm growth has been a widely studied
variable in management and strategic
research (Weinzimmer et al., 1998). Also,
professionals and scholars have questioned
the conventional ways of measuring business
risk (Ruefli et al., 1999). Assets pricing
models such as the CAPM have been
criticized because they turn out to have
corporate strategies based on synergies
(Robins, 1992).
Real assets return (ROA): The return of
the real business of the entrepreneur is
approximated by the ROA computed by the
ratio of total net income over total book
value of assets. This measure has been
widely used in the empirical literature as it
appears to capture the business return
consistently with other measures of
performance (Keats & Hitt, 1988).
Financial assets return (ProfitSicav):
The profitability of the financial portfolio of
the “entrepreneur-investor” is measured by
the ratio of the total return of the SICAV of a
given year over the total value of investment
at the beginning of the corresponding year.
Returns of the SICAV include dividend
yields and variations in the market value of
total investments.
3.2 Control variables
As control variables we use the SICAV
diversification index as a proxy for the
financial risk of the portfolio, the company’s
size, its leverage and its age. The former is
measured as Herfindahl’s index of the
SICAV portfolio for each year, calculated as
H = ΣPi
2 (Pi is the proportion of the wealth
invested in the financial asset i over the total
value of investment of the SICAV)4. The size
of the company (Size) is measured as the
natural logarithm of the assets of the firm
(Hart & Oulton, 1996). We use the natural
logarithm of total assets to approximate firm
size, following previous work (Kim &
Mathur, 2008). Leverage is calculated as the
ratio of debt to total assets, which
approximates the portion of investment
financed with borrowed funds (Short &
Keasey, 1999). Firm age (Age) is computed
as the difference between the current year
and the one in which the company was
founded. We also included the quadratic term
of this variable (Age2) to control for possible
non-linear effects of this variable. We also
included a dummy variable to control time
effects.
3.3 Estimated models and samples
To test our hypotheses we employ
different specifications of panel data models
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4 An alternative measure of diversification commonly used is provided by the entropy index (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985),
defined as E = ΣPiLog (1/Pi). It is claimed that the properties of the entropy index are advantageous in measuring diversity whereas the
Herfindahl index appears to better capture the concentration (Acar & Sankaran, 1999). Our empirical results are presented using the
Herfindahl index since additional estimation models (not shown in this paper) offered similar results after employing the entropy index.
Table 1. Descriptive statisticsaccording to the following expressions:
Growthit = λi + β1 ROAit + β2 Herfindahlit
+ β3 ProfitSicavit + β4 Sizeit + β5 Leverageit
+β6 Ageit + β7 Age2
it+ εit
ROAit = θi +α1 Growthit + α2 Herfindahlit
+ α3 ProfitSicavit + α4 Sizeit + α5 Leverageit +
α6 Ageit + α7 Age2
it+ εit
We estimated the above regressions using
three alternative specifications. First, the
specification without individual effects
(“pooled data”) assuming that λi = λ and θ =
θi for all i. The second set of models takes λi
and θi as fixed individual unobservable
effects (“fixed effects model”) and the third
one considers those parameters as random
unobservable effects (“random effects
model”). To determine the likelihood of the
different specifications we performed the
usual tests: F-statistic to test equal fixed
effects and the χ2 Hausman statistic to assess
the relative validation of the fixed versus
random effects model.
In order to evaluate the robustness of our
estimates against “outliers” we also carried
out an additional confirmation by splitting
our data into two sub-samples. One of them
included all the resulting data as described in
the section “Methodology”. Then we
constructed a subsample of the previous
observations that excludes observation with
extreme values of the variables ROA, ROE
and Growth (ROA greater than 20%, ROE
above 60%, and Growth greater than 30%).
With this procedure we attempted to control
for spurious effects owing to unobserved
phenomena (e.g. mergers and acquisitions)
or “outliers” that could distort our estimates.
The resulting subsample has 166
observations, 68 “entrepreneurs-investors”.
4. RESULTS
A first look at the descriptive statistics
(Tables 1 and 2) provides some stylized facts
about our evidence for the adverse scenario
of the Spanish economy during the period of
reference (2006-2010). Average growth in
assets for the real businesses in our sample is
slightly negative and their returns on assets
exhibit an average value of ROA of 4.59%
and a median value of 2.41%.  These results
are even worse in the case of SICAVs with a
negative average return (-2.29%), albeit
slightly positive when measured by their
median value (0.53%).
Estimates of the models representative of
the risk and return of real business are
exhibited in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. For
the sake of conciseness, estimates of dummy
variables for the year are not included. Table
3 shows the results obtained from a
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Table 2. Correlation matrix
 Growth  ROA  Herfindahl  ProfitSicav  Size  Leverage  Age  Age
2 
Growth  1,0000          
ROA  0,4517***  1,0000         
Herfindahl  -0,1159  -0,1075  1,0000        
ProfitSicav  -0,1132  0,0412 -0,0497  1,0000        
Size  0,0451 -0,0484  0,0778 0,0205 1,0000       
Leverage -0,1220  -0,4473***  0,1554*  -0,0689  0,1668  1,0000     
Age  -0,0495  -0,0964  0,0672 0,0304 0,2400**  -0,2626***  1,0000  
Age
2  -0,0493 -0,0731 0,1250† 0,0411  0,2401**  -0,1909 0,9452***  1,0000 
† p<0,1      * p<0,05     ** p<0,01    *** p<0,001 
 representative model of the real risk borne by
the “entrepreneur-investor.” A negative and
robust co-variation between performance of
the SICAV and the risk in the real main
business is supported in all models even
though the significance level of this variable
becomes attenuated when excluding the
extreme values and when performing the
“fixed effects” estimation. Therefore, this
evidence offers strong support for hypothesis
H2b.
The profitability of the real business
proxied by its ROA depicts a positive effect
on firm growth and the impact is significant
in all models at the highest levels of
confidence. This finding is consistent with
the interpretation of our dependent variable
as a proxy variable for risk of investment of
real assets inasmuch as a higher return is
expected as a result of the augmented risk
associated with a larger business growth.
Regarding the estimated effects of the
control variables, we observe a positive
effect of size on the risk of real business even
though the statistical significance of this
effect varies depending upon the
specification of the empirical model.
Coefficients of firm age and leverage as
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Table 3. Results for Growth as dependent variable
Growth 
REGRESSION 
POOLED DATA  RANDOM EFFECTS  FIXED EFFECTS 
 
Total 
sample 
Without 
extreme 
values 
Total 
sample 
Without 
extreme 
values 
Total 
sample 
Without 
extreme 
values 
ROA  0,613*** 0,777***  0,613***  0,748*** 0,728***  -0,374 
   (0,090)  (0,204)  (0,090) (0,210)  (0,201) (0,356) 
Herfindahl  -0,081  -0,015  -0,081 -0,014  -0,115 0,065 
   (0,109)  (0,082)  (0,109) (0,083)  (0,209) (0,141) 
ProfitSicav  -0,579***  -0,308**  -0,579*** -0,312**  -0,627*** -0,271* 
   (0,157)  (0,115)  (0,157) (0,114)  (0,166) (0,119) 
Size  0,004 0,014*  0,004  0,014†  0,382* 0,618*** 
   (0,100)  (0,007)  (0,100) (0,007)  (0,152) (0,119) 
Leverage  0,080 0,031  0,080  0,030  0,396† -0,023 
   (0,678)  (0,056)  (0,068) (0,058)  (0,235) (0,170) 
Age  0,001 0,000  0,001  0,000  -0,139**  -0,025 
   (0,002)  (0,002)  (0,002) (0,002)  (0,048) (0,034) 
Age
2  0,000 0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000 
   (0,000)  (0,000)  (0,000) (0,000)  (0,000) (0,000) 
_Cons  -0,124 -0,128*  -0,124  -0,126*  1,386  -2,488* 
   (0,077)  (0,059)  (0,077) (0,061)  (1,410) (1,036) 
                    
N  177  166  177 166  177 166 
R2  0,319 0,183  0,319  0,183  0,009  0,017 
Adj R2  0,278  0,130             
F
a  7,79***  3,47***             
Ȥ2 Wald
b        77,87***  32,07***       
F
c              1,28  1,68* 
Hausman
d              30,74***  32,17*** 
  † p<0,1      * p<0,05     ** p<0,01    *** p<0,001       
F
a: pooled data regression model significance       
Ȥ2 Wald
b : Random effects goodness of fit       
F
c: Individual fixed effects significance         
Hausman
d: Fixed effects vs. Random effects test 
Estimates of dummy variables of the “year” effect were included but not shown in the table 
independent variables are less robust
considering that their effects are significant
only in the “fixed effects” models and/or
with the subsample without potential
outliers.
Looking at the specification tests, the
outcomes of Hausman statistics favors the
rejection of the “random effect” specification
in all cases but the results regarding the
choice of “pooled data” versus “fixed
effects” models differ depending upon the
sample employed for estimation. When using
the whole sample, the F-test does not reject
that fixed individual effects are irrelevant
and therefore “pooled data” models are
supported. Conversely, after excluding
observations with extreme values, individual
effects become significant at the 95% level
of confidence.
Table 4 exhibits the estimates obtained
from the representative model of the real
business return as a dependent variable.
These results support hypotheses H1a as we
identify a positive relationship between the
profitability of both the return of the real
business and the portfolio profitability at the
usual confidence levels for the whole sample
with the “pooled data” and the “random
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Table 4. Results for ROA as dependent variable
ROA 
REGRESSION 
POOLED DATA  RANDOM EFFECTS  FIXED EFFECTS 
  
Total 
sample 
Without 
extreme 
values 
Total 
sample 
Without 
extreme 
values 
Total 
sample 
Without 
extreme 
values 
Growth  0,354***  0,110***  0,212*** 0,052*  0,161*** -0,033 
   (0,052)  (0,029)  (0,042) (0,025)  (0,044) (0,031) 
Herfindahl  -0,550  0,012  0,033 0,013  0,007 0,022 
   (0,083)  (0,031)  (0,079) (0,031)  (0,099) (0,042) 
ProfitSicav  0,330** 0,048  0,204*  -0,009  0,086  -0,040 
   (0,121)  (0,044)  (0,083) (0,035)  (0,083) (0,036) 
Size  0,007 0,000  0,003  0,001  -0,280***  0,091* 
   (0,007)  (0,003)  (0,010) (0,003)  (0,068) (0,039) 
Leverage  -0,328*** -0,146***  -0,303***  -0,147***  -0,080  -0,109* 
   (0,045)  (0,018)  (0,056) (0,021)  (0,112) (0,049) 
Age  -0,005** 0,000  -0,004*  0,000  -0,008  -0,006 
   (0,002)  (0,000)  (0,002) (0,000)  (0,023) (0,010) 
Age
2  0,000*  0,000  0,000 0,000  0,000 0,000 
   (0,000)  (0,000)  (0,000) (0,000)  (0,000) (0,000) 
_Cons  0,307*** 0,129***  0,294***  0,152***  1,631*  -0,099 
   (0,054)  (0,020)  (0,082) (0,017)  (0,645) (0,316) 
                   
N  177 166  177  166  177  166 
R2  0,449  0,411  0,434 0,393  0,014 0,000 
Adj R2  0,416  0,373             
F
a  13,51***  10,83***             
Ȥ2 Wald
b       65,40***  68,24***       
F
c             5,69***  3,53*** 
Hausman
d              NA  26,44** 
  † p<0,1      * p<0,05     ** p<0,01    *** p<0,001       
F
a: pooled data regression model significance       
Ȥ2 Wald
b : Random effects goodness of fit       
F
c: Individual fixed effects significance         
Hausman
d: Fixed effects vs. Random effects test 
Estimates of dummy variables of the “year” effect were included but not shown in the table 
effects” models. However, this effect fails to
be significant in the “random effects” model
and in those models using the restricted
sample.
In line with the results of previous
estimates, the risk and profitability of the real
business managed by the entrepreneur-
investor are strongly and positively related,
especially when using the whole sample. No
significant impact of SICAV’s level of
diversification on the real business
profitability is detected.
According to the results of the fixed effect
model, firm size displays a contradictory
impact on the real business return depending
upon the use of the complete (negative
effect) or restricted (positive effect) sample.
This fact can reflect the differential growth
opportunities for firms depending upon their
maturity. We see a potential explanation for
this finding in the fact that higher growth
rates are more likely for small or starting
business rather than for large and mature
companies. From this view, small companies
can face more restrictive and expensive
accessing to debt as a source of funds and,
therefore, their inclusion in the sample can
justify the reverted sign of the estimated size
effect.
We also find a consistent and negative
effect of leverage on firm return in almost
every estimated model. This fact is fully
consistent with the adverse financial scenario
in terms of higher lending rates and credit
restrictions that has characterized the
Spanish debt market since 2008. After a
decade of easy and cheap borrowing,
Spanish companies are now obliged to rule
out their growth plans by downsizing and
refocusing in order to minimize their
financial costs in an adverse environment of
an overall declining market.
Regarding the specification tests, fixed
effects models are favored over the “random
effect” estimates according to the Hausman
statistic, and we cannot reject the relevance
of individual effects at a 99.9% level of
confidence.
5. CONCLUSION
Our evidence of the relationship between
profitability and risk of the “entrepreneur-
investor” offers two major findings and has
several implications for further research.
First, we have verified our conjecture that
seemingly different economic activities
performed by the same individual cannot be
viewed as independent sets of unrelated
choices but as interlinked decisions heavily
influenced by some underlying individual
factors such as behavioral issues and the
resources of the decision maker. Within our
sample of entrepreneur-investors we have
found that the performance of a business
manager and owner as an active investor in
public markets is negatively related to the
risk that she is willing to take in her own
business. We justify this finding as a result of
the eventual bargaining process between the
entrepreneur and her supplier of financial
resources and services: as the entrepreneur
requires financing for her growing business,
the bank will secure the managed portfolio
by “advising” to invest in more liquid and
less profitable resources and/or by charging
higher fees for its services.
Second, we have confirmed a positive
link between success in the role of the
investing and managing activities carried out
by the same individual. From our
perspective, this finding supports the
existence and value of certain managerial or
entrepreneurial resources and capabilities
than can entail advantageous positions in
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such as information, social networks and
individual experience are likely to play a
crucial role in the broad catalogue of actions
deployed by an entrepreneur. Moreover,
these underlying resources and skills appear
to be non-specific as they can be applied
successfully in seemingly non-related
activities.
These main results also open some
avenues for further research. Our results are
fully consistent with the logic that there exist
some common factors among the choices
taken by a given entrepreneur as a decision
maker. However, the particular nature of
such factors remains unknown. For instance,
a closer look into the set of particular
agreements existing between the
entrepreneur and the bank would offer a
better understanding of the apparent trade-
off between business growth and the
profitability of SICAV’s portfolio.  A similar
shortcoming can be claimed in the case of
the evidenced link between the returns of the
real business and the financial portfolio. We
suspect that there is a common factor to
explain success in managerial and investing
activities but we are unable to identify its
nature and sources (privileged information,
experience, social networks). A deeper look
into this finding could deliver interesting
implications for practice as the success of an
entrepreneur-investor was highly correlated
to wider social networks or sources of
privileged information.
The particular and contextual features of
our empirical setting (i.e. a set of Spanish
‘entrepreneur-investors’) can also raise some
interesting questions about the validity of our
findings in alternative scenarios.   Whether
our findings about the relationships
examined in this research can also be valid in
other contexts than the Spanish is an
empirical question. However, we can offer
some insights on this issue. First, the so-
called globalization process has been
accompanied by an increased level of
interdependency of managerial and investing
decisions among national open economies.
Nowadays entrepreneurs and investors are
forced to compete in a global markets and
therefore successful decisions and strategic
decisions must be heavily guided by a
correct evaluation of global opportunities
and threats rather than the narrow scope
based on scanning local or regional contexts.
As a consequence, successful managerial
practices are likely to be identified and
imitated by international actors with no
distinction based on their nationality. This
logic would support the conjecture that our
findings can also be extended to any open
economies other than the Spanish one.
Nonetheless we cannot ignore that
managerial and entrepreneurial decisions are
also conditioned by institutional and cultural
factors that can determine the individual and
collective behaviors of entrepreneurs and
investors. Differences in values and
principles, cultural background, regulation,
and institutional frameworks can lead to
heterogeneous evaluation business
opportunities and threats or a divergent
appraisal and attitude against risk.  As a
result, the link between entrepreneurial and
investing behavior of individuals could
significantly depend on local environmental
conditions and, therefore our evidence would
have a more limited validity.   In any case,
these competing hypotheses certainly
deserve attention in future research.
This research also suggests some relevant
implications for managerial practice. First,
our evidence confirms that successful
entrepreneurs are likely to have better
performance in investment activities in the
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exist synergies between investing and
managerial activities based on some valuable
individual resources (such as information
and social networks), attitudes and/or skills.
A straightforward direction from this
rationale follows: an entrepreneur should
make a thorough inventory of his resources,
attitudes, and skills in order to find and
deploy any potential base for a synergy in his
investment and managerial decisions. This
requires for entrepreneurs to broaden their
perspective in the search of profit
opportunities beyond the restricted field of
their actual business by finding
complementary applications of extant
resources and skills. Second, the negative
link between investment and business risks
suggest that managers must be aware that
their choices in both economic activities are
not independent as an increased risk in the
real business appears to be compensated by a
more conservative position in stock markets.
At this point, entrepreneurs-investors should
design their investing and business plans as
partial and interlinked decisions of a broader
strategy to the extent that variations of the
risk level of their real business will exhibit
significant effects on their portfolio of stock
market investments. Thus, entrepreneurs
committed to business growth should foresee
that current and future decisions on their
investment portfolio could be restricted as a
result of such commitment.
Moreover, our evidence also has
implications about information as a core
resource of entrepreneurs and managers, and
insider trading, which is a major concern of
regulatory agencies of stock markets.
Clearly, the use of private information can be
considered as illegitimate insofar as it is used
to take advantage of uninformed investors in
public markets. From this view, the
verification of a long-lived high performance
of a real business and the financial portfolio
controlled by the same individual can serve
as an observable signal to identify potential
unlawful practices that may deserve further
investigation. In any case, additional
research about the nature and sources of
private information would help to clarify this
issue in order to determine the legitimacy of
such information. In the specific case of the
SICAVs this procedure could be effectively
implemented with few additional costs given
the requirements of these companies in terms
of transparency and accountability.
Also, our research would benefit from
future extensions based on the inherent
limitations of the available data. First, some
problems owing to the endogeneity/
simultaneity problem of empirical models
can be claimed. In this regard we point out
that our hypotheses are formulated under the
covariation or relatedness between variables,
and therefore no assumption about causal
relationships are stated in our predictions. In
this vein, alternative empirical settings could
be useful for looking into possible causal
relationships.
To sum up, our study can be viewed as
preliminary research into the complexity and
interactions that characterize the behavior of
the entrepreneur as decision maker in
seemingly unrelated actions and, in
particular, our findings provide new
evidence linking the behavior of individuals
who act in the real sector as entrepreneurs,
and in the financial sector as investors. Our
analysis has focused on the strategic decision
for company's growth as a risky decision but
our basic premises should also hold for a
number of strategic decisions such as
corporate diversification, outsourcing,
innovation and internationalization
strategies. It would also be of interest to
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interactions between entrepreneurs’ role as
investors and a more fine-grained category
of financial decisions of real business such a
debt/equity issuance and dividend policy.
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ИНВЕСТИЦИОНИХ ПЕРФОРМАНСИ ПРЕДУЗЕТНИКА
Juan David Arranz García,  José David Vicente Lorente
Извод
Овај рад представља први покушај да се истраже могуће интеракције између одлука
стварних и финансијских инвестиција агената који се у исто време понашају као предузетници
и као инвеститори на тржишту акција. Посебно, предложен је сет хипотеза о везама између
ризика и резултата инвестирања у некретнине, као и слични индикатори који се односе на
портфолио њихове имовине на тржишту капитала. Узевши “предузетник-инвеститир” као
јединицу анализе у Шпанском контексту, тестирано је неколико хипотеза које се односе на
однос између индикатора профитабилности и раста бизниса, као и мера повраћаја инвестиције
компанија са варијабилним капиталом (односно “Sociedades de Inversión de Capital Variable”;
SICAVs) које су у већинском власништву предузетника - инвеститора. На основу узорка који је
укључивао 69 власника инвестиција и “SICAV” акција, током периода 2006-2010, резултати су
потврдили да постоји значајна и позитивна веза између профитабилности предузетничког
бизниса и “SICAV”-а. Такође је пронађена негативна веза између раста реалног пословања и
профитабилности “SICAV”-а. На крају су предствљене и дискутоване импликације ових
резултата.
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